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Japanese Miracle 
CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE 
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-75, University Press, 
Stanford, 1982. 
CHALMERS JOHNSON is Professor of Political Science at the 
University of California, Berkeley. His book represents an example of 
the current of interest in political economy amongst North American 
political scientists, of which we have had some notable examples.1 In 
spite of the mechanical character ofJohnson's conception of political 
economy (to which wc shall later return) the book is valuable on four 
counts. 
Firstly, Chalmers Johnson does not believe that any specifically 
"Japanese" miracle has taken place, and denies those explanations of 
Japan's very high growth rate which are broadly based on a peculiarly 
Japanese culture, or on the efficient functioning of the freely operating 
capitalist market, or on a unique system of relationship between 
Japanese capitalists and workers in individual enterprises ("lifetime" 
employment, for example), or on the more simple minded versions of 
the explanations of Japanese industrial development in terms of Japan's 
nexus with the U S. He believes that it is one aspect of the Japan-U S 
relationship, namely, the relatively cheap import of advanced technology, 
and the ability, largely of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), to ensure the absorption of this technology, which 
transformed the Japanese industrial structure. The identification of 
strategic industrial sectors, and policies ensuring the growth of the 
internal market, helped the Japanese export strategy, and led to the 
Japanese "miracle". 
This industrial development strategy was pushed through at a 
heavy cost to the people of Japan, and also to medium and small 
enterprises. It was the big firms, evolved from the Zaibatsu conglome- 
rates, which were the beneficiaries of Japanese industrialisation 
strategies. both before and after the war. The second merit of Johnson's 
book is, therefore, the repeated references to what is evidence for the 
class character of Japanese industrialisation, although these are described 
in a way whereby the full price of the strategy is not made apparent. 
1 See, for example, Francine R Frankel India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and 
Political Costs, Princeton, University Press, 1971, and India's Political Economy, 
1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution, Princeton, University Press, 1978, 
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In other respects, however, Johnson is quite candid. A major 
chapter of the book is concerned with elaborating the political and 
administrative pre-requisites for any nation wishing to follow the 
Japanese example (he lists So'uth Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore as countries following similar strategies). This chapter is 
particularly important for Johnson clearly expects to be read seriously. 
The specific provisions which he describes are, in fact, in a form where 
they can be parcelled into the "advice" accompanving credit given to 
countries of the Third World by institutions such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. They bear similarities of 
assumption with policy prescriptions already familiar. 
The final merit of Chalmers Johnson's book lies generally in the 
information he provides on the specific tools of Japanese industrial 
policy. I-owever, to Indians (his book is clearly directed towards his 
North Amierican opponents'), familiar with the existence of the 
Industrial Development and Regulation Act, the Capital Issues Control 
Act, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, and potential controls on 
imports and exports, there is little conceptually novel in the Japanese 
system of guiding industrialisation.2 India's limping industrial growth 
rate has continued in spite of all the tools the administration might 
want, with as heavy a burden imposed on the Indian people and with 
a huge amount of technological imports. The only answer to the 
inevitable question about the differential performance of the Japanese 
and Indian economies available from Johnson is the brief mention that 
in Japan there was the sustained realisation (and this realisation was 
politically sustainable) that it is the development of the internal market 
which is crucial to economic growth 
This is largely due to Johnson's conception of political economy. 
He thinks that it comprises essentially the study of the relationships 
between governmental institutions and economic activity. Had he 
worked with Lenin's classic definition that "it is not with 'production' 
that political economy deals, but with the social relation of men in 
production, with the social system of production", he would have been 
better able to provide a true case study of industrialisation.3 
II 
Two points need to be made clear about Japan's economic 
performance. The first is the remarkable rise in industrial production 
2 After a generally appreciative review of Johnson's book by one of Fortune's editors, 
a member of Reagan's Council of Economic Affairs, responded a full year later. 
He attempted to refute Johnson's propositions and claimed that Japanese economic 
growth was due to the operation of the capitalist market meclanism rather than to 
MITI's policy. See Robert Lubar, "Inside MITI", Fortune 106 (1982), 5, and 
David R Henderson, "A Differenes of Opinion: The Myth of MITI", Fortune 
108 (1983), 3. 
3 V I Lenin, '"The Development of Capitalism in Russia", in Collected Works, 
Moscow, Progress ,1960, Vol 3, pp 62-63. 
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as shown in Table I; there was a "miracle" which requires some 
explanatio,n. 
TABLE I 
INDEX NUMBER OF PRODUCTION (1975 100) 
All Iron and Machinery Chemicals Textiles Non-ferrous Metal 
Year manu- steel metals finished 
facturing goods 
1930 5.3 2.1 1.4 2.5 21.8 4.8 - 
1940 11-0 7.3 3.8 8.5 30.4 10.1 
1950 5.1 5.1 1.8 4.7 12.6 7.3 
1960 25.3 22.4 16.5 22.3 47.9 27.8 24.4 
1970 92.2 94.2 87.7 86.8 105.2 93.8 96.9 
1978 123.0 110.1 131.5 131.0 107.7 135.0 134.9 
SOURCE: Mainichi Shimbun Sha (ed), Dictionary of Showa History, Tokyo, 1980, p 457 
quoted in Johnson, pp 4-5. 
The second point is that unlike the general impression, Japan's 
external trade does not play any significant role in its economy. "By 
the late 1960's Japan's exports were only 9.6 per cent of GNP, compared 
for example with Canada's 19.8 per cent. From 1953 to 1972 Japan had 
a consistently lower dependence on exports and imports as a percentage 
of GNP at constant prices than France, Germany, Italy, Britain or 
OECD Europe as a whole. Japan's exports ran at about 11.3 per cent 
of GNP, and its imports at 10.2 per cent, whereas the OECD European 
figures were 21.2 per cent and 20.9 per cent respectively" (p 16). 
Johnson's explanation for this tremendous growth of the 
productive forces and, clearly, the matching growth of the internal 
market is couched in the following language. While pointing out that 
"I cannot prove that a particular Japanese industry would not or could 
not have grown and developed at all without the government's industrial 
policy" (p 30), "if it can be shown that the government's industrial 
policy made the difference in the rate of investment in certain economi- 
cally strategic industries (for instance, in developing the production 
and successful marketing of petro-chemicals or automobiles), then 
perhaps we may say that its role has not been exaggerated. I believe 
this can be demonstrated and I shall attempt to do so later in this 
study"(p 9). 
Actually, Johnson's major concern is to demarcate the historical- 
political context in which specific institutions of the state arose in 
Japan, and the reasons why they were able to induce a high rate of 
investment by big firms. "There was rhore to state intervention in the 
thirties than Keynesianism, and Arisawa (an important academic advisor 
on industrial policy) and his colleagues in the government learnt lessons 
in their formative years that are quite different from those that make up 
what has come to be known in the West as mainstream governmental 
fiscal policy" (p 6). 
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These lessons included the experience of coping with the absence 
of tariff autonomy until as late as 1911 (industrial planning had been 
attempted in Japan from 1886). Unable to aid developing industries by 
protective duties and other measures, the Meiji government came to the 
conclusion that it had to take a direct hand in economic development, 
if Japan were ever to achieve economic independence. In Johnson's 
conception, industrial policy is a reflection of economic nationalism, 
understood in the sense of giving priority to the interests of the nation. 
though not necessarily involving protectionism, trade controls or 
economic warfare. However, Johnson points out, the crucial aspect of 
industrial policy is the recognition that the global economic system is 
never to be understood in terms of the free competitive model. Neither 
labour nor technology moves freely between countries: "(Industrial 
policy) refers to a complex of those policies concerning protection of 
domestic industries, development of strategic industries, and adjust- 
ment of the economic structure in response to or in anticipation of 
internal or external changes which are formulated and pursued by MITI 
in the cause of national interest as the term national interest is under- 
stood by MITI officials" (p 26). 
Following the rejection of the competitive model of the world 
capitalist system, the notion of a static international division of labour 
was also rejected by Japanese planners, In the 1970's, for example, 
Japan was expected to compete in the computer, aviation and space 
industries. A logical outcome of this view was the insistence that 
industrial policy (as opposed to "macro" economic policy) included 
direct governmental intervention at the micro level. Administratively 
this implied the need for vertical government bureaus dealing exclu- 
sively with specific industries. 
In addition to this micro aspect known to the Japanese as 
"industrial rationalization policy" there is the "industrial structure 
policy", "which is more radical and more controversial. It concerns 
the proportions of agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services in 
the nation's total production; and within manufacturing it concerns the 
percentages of light and heavy and of labour intensive and knowledge 
intensive industries. The application of the policy comes in the 
government's attempts to change these proportions in ways it deems 
advantageous to the nation. Industrial structure policy is based on 
such standards as income elasticity of demand, comparative costs of 
production, labour absorptive power, environmental concerns, invest- 
ment effects on related industries, and export prospects. The heart 
of the policy is the selection of strategic industries to be developed 
or converted to other lines of work" (p 28). 
The key to the success of the industrial structure policy was the 
availability of new technology. MITI therefore made every effort to 
suppress imports of finished goods, particularly those that competed 
with domestic products, hiit encouraged the import of technology in 
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general, and machinery in particular. The problem here was to keep 
the price down by untying the package in which the foreign technology 
normally came wrapped. Thus the technology had to be separated from 
foreign ownership, patent rights, know-how agreements, proposal for 
joint ventures, capital participation, voting rights and foreign managers 
on the boards of directors. 
Before the period of capital liberalisation of the late 1960's and 
1970's no technology entered the country without MITI's approval, nor 
were joint ventures agreed to without scrutiny and, frequently, changes 
in terms. Similarly, MITI would pressurise sellers of patent rights to 
lower royalties or make other changes advantageous to Japanese industry 
as a whole, and finally, no programme for the import of foreign teclno- 
logy was approved until MITI's advisory committees had agreed that 
the time was right. 
The Ministry's control over the investment decisions of private 
enterprises is principally obtained through the peculiarly high percentage 
of term loans in the financial structure of enterprises. As late as 1972, 
the rate of owned capital was as low as 16 per cent, a rate that has 
persisted through the post-war period. Large enterprises obtain capital 
through loans from banks which are overloaned themselves and 
dependent on guarantees by the Central Bank of Japan. The Bank, 
after a fierce struggle with the Ministry of Finance, is now essentially an 
operating arm of the ministry. The point is that the Bank of Japan 
thereby became increasingly dependent on guidelines supplied by MITI 
on the amounts of capital various industries would need for specified 
periods. These were the industries that other branches of the govern- 
ment were protecting, and the Bank of Japan ran the risk of jeopardising 
the whole credit system if its support strayed too far from the 
"designated" industries. 
Johnson points out that the resulting arrangements were very 
similar to the pre-war German banking groups with cross shareholdings 
between banks and affiliated industries. In the Japanese case, however, 
the government excercised much greater control over the "financial 
lineages" than in the German case. As far as the enterprises were 
concerned, while dividends on shares are paid after tax, interest on 
bank loans is deductable for tax purposes. It was thus far more 
profitable for enterprises to accept MITI's guidance and obtain bank 
finance than to raise money through equity issues. Although a capital 
market did develop slowly in Japan, and came to play an increasingly 
important role in industrial finance, it did not in any way rival bank 
lending as a source of capital until the 1970's. 
One advantage of the overloaning system, Johnson claims, in that 
managers were not pressurised by shareholders. They could ignore 
short term profitability as a measure of performance, and concentrate on 
foreign market penetration, quality control and long term product 
development. 
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III 
Underlying the post-war Japanese economic strategy was the cleari 
realisation that except in the case of two items, transistor radios and 
cameras, export increases had taken place following the expansion of 
the domestic market. Interestingly, the link between growth of exports 
and growth of the domestic market had been provided by a prominent 
politician who was Finance Minister, MITI Minister and latter Priime 
Minister, Ishibashi Tanzan. While arguing that the key to exports lay 
in the lowering of costs brought about by effecting economies of scale, 
he insisted that in order to enlarge production, Japanese manufacturers 
needed more customers, and these could come only from amongst the 
Japanese people. He provided, therefore, a rationale for generally 
increasing incomes, while meeting the requirements of big business 
expansion in Japan. 
Johnson provides extensive evidence for the pro-monopoly capital 
nature of Japan's industrialisation policies. The arguments were 
usually couched in terms of the necessity of increases in production, 
rationalisation of enterprises, and the raising of the technical level of 
industry. These were pre-requisites for the expansion of trade, but the 
ownership structure of Japanese enterprises implied that tiley were 
actually to accelerate centralisation and concentration of capital. In 
fact, from 1939, commercial and industrial policy was explicitly commit- 
ted to the nurturing of large-scale enterprises. 
Interestingly, some of the more far-sighted bureaucrats appear to 
have been aware of the political implications of furthering capital 
centralisation through enterprise rationalisation and modernisation but, 
for example, "With the cabinet council looking on and the Diet increa- 
singly dubious about Tojo's (war time prime minister) leadership Kishi 
(ex-bureaucrat, future prime minister) could not go beyond the basic 
parameters of the capitalist systen"(p 168). 
In other words, nationalisation of enterprises in those cases where 
the operation of economies of scale dictated the replacement of several 
small enterprises by a few large ones was not a political option. Johnson 
points out that contrary to the widely h-eld opinion that Japan is a 
classic case of the sustained role of small enterprises in development, 
MITI itself has never been very enthusiastic about its Medium and 
Smaller Enterprises Agency but "it had no choice other than to support 
it because of the political clout the small business sector wields" (p 223). 
The class interests erved by tlhe continuing presence of small enterprises 
in Japan is brought out by Johnson's statement hat North American big 
business does not have "the extensive enterprise sector of medium and 
smaller subcontractors that his Japanese counterpart can squeeze in 
difficult imes. Tornioka calls the subcontractors tlhe shock absorbers 
of the Japanese business -- the smaller firms on the recieving end 
when large firms find that they can no longer carry the fixed costs of 
tlleir labour force and must sli't the strain" (p 13). 
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In the early 1920's, despite the strategic importance of the modern 
large enterprises owned by the Zaibatsu (large industrial empires), it 
was the medium and smaller factories which employed the bulk of 
industrial workers. Again, while the Zaibatsu firms produced for the 
internal market, the medium and smaller enterprises concentrated on 
production for export. With a few exceptions such as rayon, silk yarn 
and cotton textiles where big firms predominated in exports, medium 
and smaller enterprises manufacturing items such as bicycles, pottery, 
enamelware, canned goods, hats, silk textiles and so forth were contri- 
buting 50 to 65 per cent of Japan's exports. In fact they were losing 
money in doing so, for the big Zaibatsu trading companies which 
monopolised the marketing network, provided raw materials at high 
prices and took consignments of finished products at low prices. 
Johnson argues that it was the 1927 financial panic which brought 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI, predecessor of MITI) 
into prominence. As a result of the panic, loans to smaller and medium 
enterprises became much harder to get, while access to capital for big 
Zaibatsu enterprises was made easier. Simultaneously, the Japanese 
industrial structure was "reformed", a large number of competing 
banks and enterprises were "weeded" out and centralisation of capital 
took a big step forward. Johnson remarks: "However, the way it was 
done and the enrichment of the Zaibatsu in the process contributed to 
the radicalization of the whole society and brought forth demands that 
someone speak for the nation as a whole" (pp 101-102). 
MCI's creation out of the earlier Ministry of Agriculture 
and Commerce (MAC) was itself the result of conflict between the 
ruling landlord and industrialist forces. During the boom which 
accompanied the first world war, agricultural prices went up and this 
was encouraged by MAC which hoped to increase production through 
this incentive. This was clearly what the landlords wanted, while the 
industrialists obviously wanted prices to fall, both to relieve the pressure 
on them for wage increases, and generally to promote industrial peace. 
However, rice riots in 1918 forced the resignation of the then govern- 
ment, and the succeeding government imported rice on a large scale, 
and introduced price controls. The landlord lobby, infuriated by this 
political setback, insisted on a separation of commercial and industrial 
interests from agricultural interests, and MAC was split to form a 
seperate Ministry of Agriculture and, of course, MCI. 
Following the 1927 panic and MCI's greater prominence, what 
has been called the beginning of modern Japanese industrial policy began, 
with the introduction into Japan of the concept of "industrial rationali- 
sation". German industrial rationalisation, like elsewhere, was devoted 
to the technological innovation of industries, to the installation of the 
most up-to-date machines and equipment and to general measures to 
increase efficiency. While the Japanese followed the German example 
of ermlnhasising ovellnmellt sponsored trusts and cartels as a means of 
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implementing these reforms, they also concluded that rationalisatioii 
implied reduction in competition. In the smaller and medium enter- 
prises sector, there was certainly cut-throat competition and export 
dumping, but the authorities appeard to understand that even amongst 
big business "cut throat oligopoly" should be replaced by "cordial 
oligopoly" through government encouraged cartels. The government also 
drew up plans for the control of enterprises, implementation of "scientific 
management" principles, improvements in industrial finance, standardi- 
sation of products, simplification of production processes, and subsidies 
to support the production and consumption of domestically manufactured 
goods. Big business leaders were involved in these planning activities 
and even given official accommodation. In return, they helped 
considerably in promoting MC!'s ideas amongst the big business 
community and in the Diet. 
Johnson points out that the implications of the rationalisation 
movement were clear to all the democratic forces in Japan. Rationali- 
sation implied wage cuts, reduction in employment and longer working 
hours. He says, in fact the Zaibatsu firms were the greatest bene- 
ficiaries of rationalisation. 
In the'period leading upto the second world war, the question of 
converting lines of production in small and medium enterprises towards 
munitions, or closing them altogether, became a concrete problem. On 
finding that a large amount of the imports were consumed by smaller 
enterprises for domestic use, rather than for munitions production or 
for export purposes by large enterprises, the government cut down 
imports, driving many enterprises to bankruptcy, thereby raising the 
"politically sensitive" question of the future prospects for workers 
employed in these enterprises. In answer to this problem the government 
decided, through a combination of subsidies and pressure, to shift 
production in smaller enterprises to munitions, exportable commodities, 
or import substitutes. However, some 390 000 bankruptcies took place 
during August 1938 alone. The centralisation of capital created by 
these measures increased further the power of the Zaibatsu, wiile 
shifting the industrial structure in favour of heavy and chemical-based 
industries. 
In fact, the second world war produced a profound change of 
industrial structure at the cost of the decimation of smaller enLerprises, 
and the textile iiidustry as a whole. Johnson mentions that "the iinme- 
diate cause of this shift was the enterprise readjustment... movement, a 
set of government policies that came to be so heartily disliked by the 
public that after the war even the phrase was dropped from the lexicon 
of trade and industry bureaucrats, although they of course invented new 
euphemisms for the same thing" (pp 157-158). 
These policies were made possible because of the takeover of the 
institution of the state, both directly aiid through terrorist actions by 
military officers and their ultra-nationalist civilian allies. Using tle 
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co-opted legitimacy of imperial institutions, and weakening and discre- 
diting elected political leaders, they attempted to gain complete power. 
However, Johnson points out, "they could not destroy the interests 
the politicians represented-primarily those of the Zaibatsu-and the 
Zaibatsu undertook, in self-defence, to enter the government and repre- 
sent themselves; they stopped working through politicians" (p 155). 
The enduring nature of big business power over the state is 
brought out by the fact that it was considered useful to continue a 
facade of civilian rule in order to prolong friendly trading relations with 
the United States and Great Britain (of course, before the Pacific War 
began). Dividends were therefore paid to the Zaibatsu almost to the 
end of the war, when the Zaibatsu "no longer objected to the nationali- 
sation of their destroyed factories. The Zaibatsu ownership rights 
turned out to be virtually the only civilian rights that were respected 
throughout the wartime period" (p 139). 
In the post-war period, reforms iltroduced by the US occupation 
administration modernised the Zaibatsu enterprises, freeing them of 
their earlier family domination. Johnson points out that "rentier" 
elements were removed and "entrepreneurial" and qualified managers 
encouraged, both to take over established enterprises, and to promote 
new ones. 
IV 
Japan's industrialisation strategy caused hardships of unbelievable 
severity to the people. If the price level in August 1945 is taken to be 
100, it rose to 346.8 in September, 584.9 in Deceinber, and to 1184.5 the 
following March. Perhaps the best way of bringing out the harshness of 
conditions is to provide a few examples of the oligarchic unconcern for 
the mass of the people. 
"It (Reconstruction Finance Committee) was one of a set of insti- 
tutions that the Japanese created after the war to try and pull themselves 
out of the post-war economic collapse and to restore production to 
pre-war levels regardless of the fierce inflation it generated" (p 179). 
"The Japanese public paid a heavy price for this shift in industrial 
structure. Jerome B Collern argues that the Japanese consumer was hit 
harder by war than civilians in any other belligerant country for which 
data is (sic) available" (p 165). 
"Priority productioln was a schemen to concentrate all of the 
economy's assets in a few strategic sectors, regardress of the effects this 
might have on civilian consumption or inflation" (p 182). 
"Although no Japanese official doubts that the RFB (Reconstruc- 
tion Finance Bank) inflation inllicted enormous lhardships on the people 
and that the ultimately liad to be stopped, priority production had an 
important effect on later bureaucratic attitudes as a precedent for bolder 
rather than more cautious, fiscally responsiblly courses of action" (p1 186). 
"The priority pro(dlltcli{ol sclhellic was proving to be very ;hard on 
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ordinary citizens since it subsidised producers but ruined households 
through inflation, rigged prices, and shortages" (p 184). 
"The first few years of the occupation were a period of immense 
complexity, extremely rapid social change, and for the Japanese people 
a bitter struggle for survival-the time of the'prison of hunger', as they 
spoke of it then" (p 177). 
"During the winter of 1949-50 the Japanese people faced some 
of the harshest economic conditions they had seen since the war ended, 
and the threat of revolution came perilously close" (p 200) 
"...imports outran exports whenever the people's economic con- 
ditions improved even slightly" (p 219). 
In December 1948 the US government ordered the occupation 
administration to make the quick attainment of Japanese economic self- 
sufficiency its primary objective. On December 19, 1948, "General 
MacArthur transmitted to the Japanese government his nine point 
Economic Stabilisation Plan. This called for...several other reforms 
that were intended to bring Japan back into international commerce but 
that would also impose very harsh conditions on the Japanese people 
until the exports began to flow.... 
"The US government sent an advisor in early 1949 whose most 
important achievement was the sudden drastic curtailment of inflation 
through unemployment" (p 190). 
This however seemed to be the turning point, and with the 
outbreak of the Korean war the US armed forces placed an order for 
over 7000 lorries with Japanese firms, worth nearly 13 million dollars. 
Johnson mentions that this was the key to the revival of the Japanese 
motor industry. The 'cold war' had begun, in China the Communist Party 
had successfully led the revolution, and "the US now saw Japan as 
strategic territory of critical importance to its own security and not just 
as an object for political reform policies that had grown out of the 
ideological confrontations of World War II" (p 189). Special procure- 
ments and the expenditures of US troops made up 37 per cent of foreign 
exchange receipts in 1952-53 and as much as 11 per cent in 1959-60. 
With this political support and economic stimulus, the Japnnese "mira- 
cle" was set into motion. 
V 
By the late 1950's MITI's system of developing a new industry 
consisted of the lollowing types of measures. Firstly, an investigation, 
followed by a basic policy statement on the need for the industry, and 
its future prospects was drafted in the Ministry. Foreign exchange was 
then allocated by MITI and funding provided by the Development Bank 
for the industry. Licences for the import of technology and the 
designation of the industry as "strategic", which allowed for accelerated 
depreciation, followed, together with the provision of developed land at 
a nominal cost or even entirely free. Finally the industry was given 
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important tax concessions and an "administrative guidance cartel" was 
established to regulate competition, and coordinate investment among 
the firms in the industry. 
In more general terms, tools of implementation of industrial 
policy included discriminatory tariffs, preferential commodity taxes on 
national products, import restrictions based on foreign currency alloca- 
tions, and foreign currency control. On the "developmental" side, they 
consisted of low interest funds to targeted industries, exclusion from 
import duties of designated critical equipment, and the other measures 
mentioned earlier. 
However, just as MITl's tools of industrial development policies 
were being perfected, the IMF and GATI' began to demand that Japan 
"liberalise" its controls on currency convertibility and on imports. 
Johnson points out that the ingenuity displayed by M rI in response to 
these pressures emanated essentially fronm he bureaucracy, for adminis- 
trators realised that without a sophisticated response, liberalisation held 
dangers of making their jobs redundant. The response came in the 
form of the concept of "industrial structure", and of the Industrial 
Structure Investigation Council. The concept involved a comparison 
of Japanese industry with those of North America and Europe in terms 
of capital intensity, export ratios, concentration, economies of scale and 
otlier indicators of international competitive ability. After such 
comparisons, the concept was used further to assert that while Japanese 
industry was fully capable of competing internationally, competition 
within the industry lad to be ieduced by mergers and investment 
coordination cartels. The basic problem, as seen though the eyes of the 
administration, was similar to that faced in the late 1920's and early 
1930's. There were too many protected enterprises in too many small 
factories engaged in "too vigorous and economiically unproductive 
competition" (p 256). Liberalisation would expose them to international 
pressure; some of themr might pass into foreign ownership and worst of 
all, MITl might have no continuing function to play. The answers to 
this, though couched in euplhemisms such as "public-private cooperation", 
"consolidation of the industrial order", and "structural finance", 
were cartels, enforced me rgers, pressure on medium and smnaller 
enterprises, and conversion of some businesses to other lines of 
activity. 
Notwithstanding these )policies towards. essentially, smaller enter- 
prises, MITI continued to protect larger enterprises from foreign 
competition. Johnson quotes the case of IBMR which liad organised 
itself as a yen company in order to overcome the restrictions on the use 
of foreign exehange and repatriationl of profits. IBM lield on to its 
basic patents on computer technollogy, and effectively blocked the 
development of the Japanese computer industry. --owever, MITI made 
it clear that IBM must sell its patelted technology, antd at(c(cet lthe 
Ministry's guidance ovet thle mlllmlbier of co(1m11p)iters it c(O,L1d manrket 
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domestically, if it wished to continue in Japan. To overcome IBM's 
strategy of leasing, rathar than selling, computers, MITI established a 
leasing company, which bought indigenous computers and leased them 
to customers. 
The continuing pressure from international agencies for "liberali- 
sation" implied that MITI was not able to provide a legal basis for its 
administrative guidance activities. It relied heavtly on the influence 
it could exert through former officials who had retired and joined the 
boards of private companies. However, some of the firms in the very 
biggest stratum of Japanese enterprises were unwilling to accept 
pre-emption of their investment decisions by MITI. It was the 
Mitsubishi group, as Johnson says, that should be "given the credit" 
for the "liberalisation" of the Japanese economy. Mitsubishi was 
powerful enough to become the dominant (65:35) partner in a joint 
venture with Chrysler Corporation, whereby Mitsubishi's small car was 
to be sold in the US market by Chrysler dealers. Following this, Isuzu 
independently accepted another 65:35 joint venture with General 
Motors, although in this case MITI was able to rewrite the agreement 
to ensure that General Motors did not gain control of the jointly held 
company. The late 1960's and early 1970s, in fact, saw a challenge to 
MITI's supremacy, and Johnson gives, as an example, the instance 
where the MITI vice-minister (administrative head) actually had to 
call on business leaders "and say that if private enterprise wanted to 
enter into tie-ups with foreigners, MITI would offer no objection" 
(p 288). Although this was symbolic, the power implications were 
clear to all. 
MIrI's ability to respond to critics in a sophisticated manner 
was again made evident in the new industrial policy announced in 1971. 
MITI acknowledged that "high speed growth" had led to problems of 
pollution, inadequate investment in public facilities, rural depopulation 
aud urban overcrowding. It proposed the addition of two new 
standards for determining which industries were appropriate for the 
evolving industrial structure: to the high income elasticity of demand and 
high growth rate of productivity, were added an "overcrowding and 
environmental standard" and a "labour content standard". These new 
standards meant that the ministry would try to phase out industries that 
contributed to overcrowding and pollution, and attempt to replace them 
with high technology, smokeless, "knowledge intensive" industries. 
However, the 1973 oil price "shock" led to a 29 per cent inflation rate; 
and this, combined with MITI's indictment by another government 
agency, for forcibly reducing competition and serving big business 
interests through "administrative guidance", led to questions of whether 
MITI served "national interests" or only big business interests. How- 
ever irritating it might be, a former MITI vice-minister ruminated, in a 
lecture to his juniors in the bureaucracy, that officials are duty bound to 
act withinl the law, and on thle basis of law. 
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VI 
Although Chalmers Johnson's book has the merit of including a 
great deal of information, his theoretical framework betrays his philistine 
approach. His conception of the state brings home vividly Lenin's 
warnings about the confusions sown by bourgeois theorists of the state, 
but this case is even more remarkable for the theorist here, as we shall 
show, has confused himself.4 In Johnson's own words (though in 
another context), "years of disputation with Marxist-Leninists" has led 
Western political scientists to ignore Marx and Lenin except evidently 
through chance acquaintanceship gained through second hand sources. 
Johnson's explanation of the Japanese "miracle" is based on a 
distinction he makes between the Japanese "devclopmenal state", the 
North American "regulatory state", the "bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes of South America" and the "communist dictatorships of develop- 
ment". The very fact of his counterposing these four political and social 
systems brings out clearly his conception of state as limited to specific 
forms of relationship between the bureaucracy, the legislature and the 
judiciary. Johnson quotes approvingly the view of an author that "the 
notion that the 'modern state power is merely a committee which 
manages the common business of the bourgeoisie' is one of the historically 
least adequate generalizations that Marx ever made" (p 24). Johnson 
goes on to say that in addition to its "historical inadequacy", it obscures 
the "fact that in the developmental state economic interests are 
explicitly subordinated to political objectives" (p 24). It is clear, though 
scarcely believable, that Johnson has interpreted the word "business" in 
the quotation from Marx literally, i e, as purely "commercial". Johnson 
adds his own criticism that Marx's formulation is not merely 
"historically inadequate; it obscures the fact that in the developmental 
state economic interests are explicitly subordinated to political objectives. 
The very idea of the developmental state originated in the situational 
nationalism of the late industrializers, and the goals of the develop- 
mental state were invariably derived from comparisons with external 
reference economies" (p 24). 
Johnson evidently does not understand that theoritically the bour- 
geoisie, particularly the bourgeoisie of the "late industrializers", may 
have political as well as commercial "business". This is all the more 
confounding when Johnson provides many examrples of the ways in 
which Japanese political strategies consistently strengthened the econo- 
mic base of the Japanese bourgeoisie. The clue to the theoretical 
reason for Johnson's amazing incapacity to "read" his data in what 
would appear to be the most straightforward (and scientific) manner is 
provided by another of his approving quotations: "As Henry Jacoby 
puts it, 'once capitalism transformed the traditional way of life, factors 
4 V I Lenin, "The State: A Lecture Delivered at the Sverdlov University, July 11, 
1919", in Collected Works, Progress, 1965, Vol 2'9, pp 470-472. 
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such as the effectiveness of competition, freedom of movement, and the 
absence of any of social security compelled the state to assume responsi- 
bility for the protection and welfare of the individual. Because each 
man was responsible for himself, and because that individualism became 
a social principle, the state remained as almost the only regulatory 
authority' " (p 19). 
It is Johonson's allegiance to these Ayn Rand formulations that 
led him to the coldblooded recommendations that we shall discuss 
shortly. Essentially, his view is that the state stands up, above social 
conflict, attempting all the while to alleviate suffering, and mediating 
conflict when it approches an extreme. 
Johnson analyses the Japanese "developmental state" by 
comparison, as we have mentioned, with three other "states". Arguing 
that the developmental state is often confuised with the regulatory state 
by observers from "market rational systems", he adds that as the 
developmental state has a political and not an economic basis, it is not 
just a question of state intervention that distinguishes between the two: 
while the Untited States government las many regulations concerning 
the anti-trust implications of the size of firms, it does not, for instance, 
concern itself with what industries ought to exist, and what industries 
are no longer needed. The developmental, or plan-rational state, by 
contrast, has the dominant goal of setting substantive social and 
economic goals. Johnson believes that economists dominate policy 
making in market rational states, while "nationalistic political officials" 
dominate it in the latter. While the Congress controls the budget in 
the U.S, and most economic decisions are made there, reflecting ''the 
market-rational emphasis on procedures rather than outcomes", in 
Japan budget appropriations precede authorisations. "With the single 
exception of 1972, when a combination of government mishandling and 
opposition unity led to a small reduction in defense spending, the 
budget has not been amended in the Diet since 1955" (p 10). Before 
this time there was no pretence that the Diet did anything more than 
rubber stamp the bureaucracy's budget. 
Johnson notes that any country wishing to match Japan's econo- 
mic achievcments must adopt the same priorities that the Japanese did. 
"(The state) must first of all be a developmental state-and only then a 
regulatory state, a welfare state, an equality state or whatever other 
kind of functional state a society may wish to adopt. This commitment 
to development does not, of course, guarantee any particular degree of 
success; it is merely pre-requisite" (p 306). 
In the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes of South America the 
"ruling elites", according to Johnson, promote industrialisation while 
excluding from power previously mobilised economic groups (workers, 
peasants and the middle class, presumably) through the development of 
collaborative relationships with transnational corporations. A techno- 
cratic political arrangement relying heavily on coercion enforces the 
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rules of the game in these countries. Japan on the other hand is a 
democracy (albeit one where legislative and judicial functions are 
restricted to "safety valve" operations) in which politicians "are chosen 
by the votes of the majority". Japanese political stability "has rested 
on the ability of the ruling political party to forge a coalition of voters 
committed to economic growth and effective management"(pp 316-317). 
Johnson does not approve of the political arrangements in the 
socialist conntries ("communist dictatorships of development") because 
he feels that while capitalist development states ignore non-strategic 
sectors of the society, the "communist state attempts directly and forci- 
bly to demobilize them" (p 316). His reasons are pragmatic (though 
in a deeper sense, disturbingly frivolous in regard to crucial issues). 
"The first (capitalist development state) is preferable because it avoids 
the unintended consequences of the presence of large numbers of police 
and the full apparatus of repression, which is not only wasteful of 
resources but is also incompatible with effective international 
commerce" (p 316). 
Johnson characterises "Soviet type economies" as plan ideological 
as opposed to plan rational for he believes that in such societies, "state 
ownership of the means of production, state planning and bureaucratic 
goal setting" are fundamental values in themselves, "not to be challenged 
by evidence of inefficiency or ineffectiveness" (p 18). Japan, on the 
other hand, is plan rational for here state planning and bureaucratic goal 
setting are "rational means to a developmental goal". 
In Japan, the legislatiure, even though a "puppet diet", has worked 
through the majority held by the Liberal Democratic Party, as a 
mediator between "the state" (here Johnson seems to imply the 
bureaucracy) and "society". It has forced tile bureaucracy to accommo- 
date interests such as those of agriculure. medium and smaller enterprises 
which could "not be ignored", and also to focus on issues such as 
pollution. At the same time "it has held off or forced compromises 
from those groups whose claims might interfere with the development 
programme" (p50). Johnson believes that it has performed its task 
equitably leaving a "comparatively level pattern of income distribution 
and of hardships" (p50). This is difficult to reconcile with his own 
data on the effects of development policy on small and medium enter- 
prises, and on the people in general. 
Johnson notes that the political division of labour observed in 
Japan where the politicians "reign" and the bureaucrats "rule" is 
typical of developmental states. He soothes outraged liberal sentiment 
by denying that this formulation is either a "cynical comment on 
modern government or a counsel of despair concerning the realities of 
democracy" (p 154). Both sides, he tells us, have a role to play. Both 
legislature and judiciary must be ready to intervene when bureaucracy 
goes too far ("which it undoubtedly will"), "but their more important 
overall function is to fend off the numerous interest groups in the 
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society, which if catered to would distort the priorities of the develop- 
ment state. In the case of interests that cannot be ignored, deflected, 
or satisfied in symbolic ways-or upon which the perpetuation of the 
political system depends-the political leaders must compel the 
bureaucracy to serve and manipulate them"(pp 315-316, emphasis aded). 
Having settled the question of the "inadequacy" of Marx's for- 
mulation of the nature of the state, Johnson proceeds to analyse precisely 
the problem of the nature of relationship between the stale and big 
business. He agrees that there is collaboration between the two 
essentially taking the form of preferential access to government by 
"prime contractors" and "vital political support groups". Less strategi- 
cally placed groups have little access though more, Johnson feels, than 
under the admittedly oligarchic Meiji constitultion. Entrepreneurs in 
strategic industries gain preferential access, Johnson emphasises, not 
unintentionally, but through the post-retirement placing of senior 
bureaucrats on the boards of big enterprises. 
The fruits of the state-big business collaboration are selective 
access to government guaranteed financing, targeted tax reliefs, govern- 
ment sponsored investment coordination which ensures that all 
participants remain profitable, and enquitable allocation of burdens 
during recessionary conditions (something, Johnson notes, that private 
cartels find hard to do). The government also helps in the commerciali- 
sation and sale of products, and provides assistance when an industry 
as a whole begins to decline. 
Johnson lists witli seeming ingenuity ihe negative features of the 
developmental state. Preferential access may tempt some to use it to 
private advantage. There may be "protest" demonstrations. Periodic 
corruption scandals may arise because of the separation of those who are 
reigning and those who are ruling and the opportunities "this condition 
gives some insiders to exploit the developmental programme". Johnson 
has his travelling kit bag however, and tells us that if scandals occur 
amongst politicians and not bureaucrats, and the development effort is 
proceeding to the benefit of all, these scandals will be tolerated as 
unfortunate but not too serious imperfections in the overall system". 
However, corruption amongst the bureaucracy is more sericus and "quick 
surgery and reconstitution of the system" is called for. Johnson confirms 
that occasional abuse of office by a senior official is not a "serious" 
issue in Japan. The cooperation between government and big business 
"may however have unintended consequences" andJapan has experienced 
a series of major governmental corrlption scandals in its recent past. 
Moving on to the institutional content of the "developmental 
state", Johnson points out that industrial policy, although the raison 
d'etre of such a state, remains a controversial subject--both what it is 
and how it is done. He argues that the leaders of MITI and its predecessor 
ministries had no preconceived plan and realised quite late that they 
were developing "an implicit theory of the developtnental state". The 
88 
This content downloaded from 122.176.152.47 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 05:55:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JAPANESE MIRACLE 
language of all bureaucracies is "euphemistic and often opaque" and 
Johnson's attempt in the book has been to reveal the intentions and 
concepts often hidden behind these euphemisms and slogans. In one 
specific case, that of MITI's Special Measures Law for the Promotion 
of Designated Industries of 1962-63, the problem lay precisely in the 
fact that it made "explicit what had long been implicit in MITI's 
industrial policy". The law became controversial because of jurisdic- 
tional disputes between MITI and the Ministry of Finance, the Fair 
Trade Commission and Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organi- 
sations). The Finance Ministry opposed the law's attempt to bring the 
banks within the purview of MITI's proposed "discussion groups". The 
Fair Trade Commission felt that the occupation inspired anti-monopoly 
law would be made totally redundant, and Keidanren wanted "self 
control" rather than "MITI control". The bill incorporating the law 
was never, under this combined opposition and the controversy raised, 
brought to the vote in the Diet. However, Johnson argues, it was 
precisely the confrontations of this kind which brought home to the 
"state" (i e, the bureaucracy) the need for the capitalist market 
mechanism, and to the private enterprise the need for bureaucratic 
coordination. "Once both sides recognised this, cooperation was 
possible and high speed growth occurred." 
VII 
Johnson's study is essentially an institutional one, institutions 
being defined here as "formal and informal, explicit and implicit social 
structures developed to coordinate activities within large formal organi- 
sations such as corporations, governmental bodies and universities, and 
to link these organisations to one another" (p 238). 
In the Japanese case, the institutions form a system which 
developed over time and which are "a formidable set of institutions 
for promoting economic growth" (p 12). Taken separately, however, 
they make little sense, and the importance of the concept of institution 
mentioned above is that it allows for the interconnections to be brought 
out. Johnson believes that the result is a developmental state "much 
softer and more tolerable (sic) than the communist-dominated command 
economies...but with considerably greater goal setting and goal achieving 
capability than the market rational system" (p 51). 
The core of the system is the bureaucracy which early in recent 
Japanese history gained an ascendency over political parties as represen- 
tatives of dominant propertied interests. In that fractional dispute with 
political organisations, the bureaucracy claimed to speak for the entire 
nation while characterising their rivals as representing sectional or local 
interests. Johnson recognises that both the bureaucracy and politicians 
deal in power "and struggles for power are an inextricable part of 
bureaucratic life, regardless of what models organisation theorists may 
have favoured from Weber to the present" (p 106). He also agrees with 
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another author that direct participation by the people in politics had to 
be forestalled if bureaucratic power was to be preserved in the post-war 
period and that the bureaucracy fully realised this. It is his ingenuity, 
the obverse to his hard headedness therefore, when lie wonders: "For 
reasons that are none too clear the occupation authorities...never 
singled out the civilian bureaucracy as needing basic reform" (p 41). 
Can it be arrogance that makes it "none too clear" that the 
occupation authorities may have realised 30 years before him that 
the bureaucratic system was crucial to the stability of the Japanese 
political system? He is clear that both "government" (could this be the 
inadequately conceptualised "committee to manage the business of the 
bourgeois"?) and industry recognised the need for a political division of 
labour in the post-war democratic political system. There was also a 
need to "forestall disruption" of the positive "development" by the 
newly enfranchised groups in the society. Thus the division between 
the "reign" of politicians and the "rule" of the bureaucracy came 
about. The bureaucracy itself has been, until recently, above the law, 
in the sense of independent judicial review. In fact, "rather than a rule 
of law, a rule of bureaucracy prevails". Administration is "for the 
sake of the citizenry" rather than carried out "with the participation of 
the citizenry". While this was true for the people at large, Johnson is 
clear that after the war the bureaucracy began to consult big business 
on all important issues and blurred "the distinction between the state 
and the private sector by insinuating (sic) numerous ex-bureaucrats 
into the board rooms of the economically strategic industries" (p 196). 
It is perhaps appropriate to end with two quotations which bring 
out clearly the political implications of the Japanese, Taiwanese, South 
Korean and Singapore model of economic growth. "Although it is 
influenced by pressure groups and political claimants, the elite 
bureaucracy of Japan makes most major decisions, drafts virtually all 
legislation, controls the national budget, and is the source of all major 
policy innovations in the system" (p 20). "Nevertheless, it must be 
pointed out that the effective operation of the developmental state 
requires that the bureaucracy directing economic development be 
protected fron all butt he most powerful interest groups so that it can set 
and achieve long-range industrial priorities. A system in which the full 
range of pressure and interest groups existing in a modern, open 
society has effective access to the government will surely not achieve 
economic development, at least under official auspices, whatever other 
values it may fulfil" (p 44; emphasis added). 
This is surely a cheerful message for "nationalist political 
officials"attending courses on "developmental administrations". 
NASIR TYABJI 
Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras. 
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